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Abstract
Background: Gatekeeping involves a generalist doctor who controls patients’ access to specialist care, and has
been discussed as an important policy option to rebalance the primary care and hospital sectors in low- and
middle-income countries, despite thin evidence. A gatekeeping pilot in a Chinese rural setting launched in 2013
has offered an opportunity to study the functioning of gatekeeping under such conditions.
Methods: In this qualitative study within a mixed-method evaluation of the gatekeeping pilot, we developed an
innovative systems analysis method, combining the World Health Organisation categorisation of health system
building blocks, the “Framework” approach of policy analysis and causal loop analysis. We conducted in-depth
interviews with 20 stakeholders from 4 groups (patients, doctors, health facility managers and government
administrators) in the pilot area over two years. Based on information extracted from the interviews, we drew
a causal loop diagram which highlighted the feedback loops within the system that had self-reinforcing or
self-balancing characteristics, and used the diagram to examine systematically the mechanisms of intended and
actual functioning of gatekeeping and analyse the systems level challenges that affected the effectiveness of
gatekeeping.
Results: Had the gatekeeping pilot programme worked as intended, it would incentivize both providers and
patients to increase service utilization at primary care level, as well as establish and enhance two reinforcing
feedback loops to shift balance towards primary care. However, a performance-based salary policy undermined
the motivation for clinical primary care. Furthermore, the primary care providers suffered from three reinforcing
feedback loops (related to primary care capacity, human resource sustainability, patients’ faith) that trapped primary
care development in vicious cycles. At the interface between hospitals and primary care providers, there were
also feedback loops exacerbating the existing hospital dominance. These feedback loops were intensified by
the unintended consequences of concurrent policies (restrictions on technologies and medicines) and delayed
reform in hospitals. Furthermore, the gatekeeping policy itself faced resistance to further development, due to the
prevailing ineffective and ritualistic nature of gatekeeping, which formed a balancing loop.
Conclusions: The study shows that the intended benefits of gatekeeping were illusionary largely due to weak
and worsening primary care conditions, and delay, ineffectiveness or unintended consequences of several other
ongoing reforms. One particularly dangerous development of the system, which deserves urgent attention, is the
harming of the professional prospects of primary care doctors. Our findings highlight the need for coordination and
prioritization in designing policies related to primary care and managing changes with multiple on-going reforms.
The approach used here facilitates comprehensive study of intended and actual mechanisms, and demonstrates the
challenges of a complex health system intervention in a dynamic environment.
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Background
World-wide momentum has been growing to push for
progress towards universal health coverage, enshrined in
the United Nations’ 2030 agenda for sustainable devel-
opment [1]. With increasing financial resources being
committed, what is needed “now more than ever” are
health systems that focus on primary care–“person-
centredness, comprehensiveness and integration, and
continuity of care, with a regular point of entry into
the health system” [2]. Strengthening primary care is
likely to have strong implications for cross-national
equity in health. Countries with stronger primary care
tended to have better population health [3, 4].
Primary care also mitigates the negative health effects
of income inequality [5].
Gatekeeping is frequently suggested as a policy option
to strengthen the function of primary care facilities [6, 7].
Gatekeeping has been defined as an arrangement between
primary care providers and specialists which involves a
generalist (primary care doctor, family medicine doctor,
general practitioner, etc.) who controls access to specialist
care and coordinates care for patients [8]. Despite re-
peated claims of use, effects of gatekeeping have been
found to be mixed in high-income countries, while little
has been understood about the functioning of gatekeeping
in low- and middle-income settings [9].
Primary care strengthening has been a central aim in
China’s health system reform officially launched in 2009
[10]. In 2015, China’s State Council further made gate-
keeping (“first contact at primary care level”) one of its
central policies in establishing a well-functioning referral
system by 2020 [11]. Indeed, previous studies from China
suggested that a large proportion of patients treated in
hospitals could be managed more cost-effectively at lower
levels of care [12–14], implying huge potential for gate-
keeping. However, a literature review exposed a paucity of
research articles about reform pilots in China involving
gatekeeping [15]. Furthermore, health system changes in
recent decades that affected both the primary care sector
and hospitals profoundly [6, 16–18] are likely to influence
the functioning of gatekeeping.
A pioneering gatekeeping pilot programme was
launched in 2013 under the New Rural Cooperative
Medical Scheme (NCMS) in two rural townships in a
large municipality in northern China. This study aimed
to understand qualitatively the functioning of the gate-
keeping pilot and to draw lessons on shifting balance
from hospitals to primary care providers for similar set-
tings elsewhere. A parallel study undertook an impact
evaluation [19]. This study employed a qualitative sys-
tems analysis, which combined a categorisation tool for
health systems building blocks, a qualitative method for
policy analysis, and causal loop analysis. The remainder
of this section provides the rationale behind the
application of the central methodological element of this
paper—causal loop analysis.
Literature on gatekeeping suggests it is a complex health
system issue. Gatekeeping programmes involve varied ar-
rangements of gatekeeping and cost-sharing policies for
accessing outpatient specialist care [9, 20]. How gatekeep-
ing programmes function also seems context-specific. For
example, a study in the Netherlands showed that general
practitioners use a “demand-satisfying” attitude when it
comes to gatekeeping, even though they think patients are
given unnecessary care [21]. Analyses on gatekeeping have
also revealed a range of interrelated consequences in rela-
tion to ethical concerns of physician incentives to profit
from controlling referral [22, 23], equity [24–27], patient
satisfaction [28–31] (which has implications for health
outcome and compliance of patients [32]), and delayed
diagnosis of cancer [33, 34]. While some of these were
intended by policy makers, others were unintended.
Furthermore, the gatekeeping intervention in China
was introduced in order to produce changes in health
delivery that can be conceptualized as a system involving
two interrelated sectors of health services: hospitals and
primary care providers. In other words, gatekeeping as
implemented in the pilot and advocated in the national
policy document, was an intervention primarily targeted
at the interface between primary care providers and
hospitals. Therefore, a systematic evaluation of gatekeep-
ing in China needs to address the dynamic interrelation-
ships between the two sectors.
The various arrangements, context-specificity, multiple
and interrelated impacts, as well as the nature of the
gatekeeping pilot suggested the need for an approach
that allows sufficient sensitivity to and synthesis of the
multiple factors in the interrelating dynamics. Systems
thinking has been described as a mind-set which sees
systems and sub-components of systems as interrelated
to one another, and interprets the interrelationships as
the key to knowledge about how things function [35].
Advocated as useful for health systems and policy re-
search, systems thinking has proved valuable in revealing
key elements of success and failure in implementing
complex interventions, including the role and import-
ance of relationships, actors in health systems, environ-
mental factors, anticipating potential unintended
consequences, and systematically evaluating the imple-
mentation process and reactions to feedbacks within the
systems [36–38]. Combining qualitative methods with
systems thinking can add depth to analysis of health sys-
tems issues, and adding visualization can help convey
complex interpretations and findings [35].
Causal loop analysis is a method among the tools of ap-
plied systems thinking. It maps out and qualitatively models
the dynamics amongst a number of interconnected factors
using causal loop diagrams (CLDs). Recent application of
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CLDs in the field of health policy and systems research has
included studies on an immunization system [39], neonatal
mortality [40], medical dual practice [41], and integrated
Community Case Management (iCCM) of malaria, pneu-
monia and diarrhoea [42]. In these studies, CLDs make ex-
plicit cause-and-effect relationships and facilitate
understanding and interpretation of interacting factors and
feedback loops that contribute to important policy issues.
Causal loop analysis has not been used to study gatekeeping.
Methods
Qualitative systems analysis
In causal loop analysis, the basic unit of a CLD is a
causal link. Each causal link between two variables has a
direction and a polarity. Direction denotes the cause and
the effect within a link, illustrated by an arrow departing
from the cause and arriving at the effect. There are two
types of link polarity in CLDs: positive and negative. A
positive link means that, all else being equal, a change of
the cause variable will lead to a change of the effect vari-
able in the same direction, compared to the situation
when the cause variable is held unchanged; in contrast, a
negative link means that, all else being equal, a change
of the cause variable will lead to a change of the effect
variable in the opposite direction, compared to the situ-
ation when the cause variable is held unchanged.
Connecting these links generates feedback loops (closed
circular causal relationships) that may be connected to
relevant variables that do not fall in any feedback loop.
There are two main types of feedback loop, namely, re-
inforcing loops, when the sum of negative causal links
within the loop produces an even number, and balancing
loops, when the sum of negative causal links produces an
odd number [43–45]. Table 2 illustrates the symbolic rep-
resentation used in the causal loop diagram in this study.
As a tool, CLDs do not automatically generate the in-
formation needed for their construction. Sterman sug-
gested that data collection and analysis should be based
on qualitative methods [44], however, there has been lit-
tle guidance on how to rigorously generate CLDs from
qualitative interviews. It has been also unclear how to
cover the range of health systems issues involved in the
functioning of complex interventions like gatekeeping.
Therefore, we linked causal loop analysis with the World
Health Organization (WHO) classification of health sys-
tem building blocks and the “Framework” approach for
data analysis. Information was collected after the launch
of the gatekeeping pilot from both pilot townships and a
non-pilot township within the district where the pilot
was implemented.
Study process
Table 1 presents the process of the study, which con-
sisted of five stages.
The first stage involved the development of a prelimin-
ary thematic framework and research tools, with the aid
of the WHO categorisation of health system building
blocks. National and local policy documents were col-
lected from the municipal and district health bureaux
and central government. We analysed the documents
and developed a preliminary thematic framework and
question guides including questions about implementa-
tion and intended mechanisms of the gatekeeping pilot
programme, as well as questions about systems level
factors that potentially influenced the gatekeeping
programme. For systems level factors, the framework
and question guide was constructed based on the WHO
categorisation of health system building blocks [46], with
questions focusing on the interactions between building
blocks (i.e. service delivery, health workforce, health in-
formation, medical technologies, health financing, and
leadership and governance).
For the second stage, fieldwork was carried out in two
phases (November 2014 and July 2015) during the pilot
programme. For this qualitative study, semi-structured
interviews with key stakeholders were conducted to
identify the effects, mechanisms of gatekeeping and its
constraints. The lead author interviewed the following
categories of stakeholders: ambulatory patients with
experiences of the gatekeeping policies identified from
ambulatory patients visiting primary care facilities, phy-
sicians and managerial staff from a district hospital and
three township health centres (two pilot township health
centres and a non-pilot typical township health centre),
and administrators of the municipal and the district
NCMS agencies and the district health bureau. The
main characteristics of interviewees are presented in
Appendix Table 3.
There were six ambulatory patients in the pilot town-
ships with experiences related to referral from primary
care facilities. Ambulatory patients visiting primary care
facilities were asked randomly whether they had
requested to visit higher levels of care and were either
referred or rejected, or had not requested but were
referred by primary care practitioners on the practi-
tioners’ initiative. As nobody said their request for refer-
ral had been rejected, we recruited those who had been
referred. Unfortunately, there was no way for us to iden-
tify patients referred from the two townships at the
Table 1 Study process
Stage Content
1 Developing preliminary thematic framework and research tools
2 Fieldwork and interviews
3 Initial analysis of interview transcripts
4 Interpretation of data and tabulation
5 Construction of causal loop diagrams and analysis
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district hospital, due to both the small numbers and the
fact that the referral letters were not presented by pa-
tients to hospital staff—they were used only for claiming
reimbursement back in their townships. Eight doctors
with experience of dealing with patient referral in the
pilot district were interviewed, including two from the
district hospital and six from primary care facilities. As
there were barely any independent village doctors in the
district, the lead author interviewed a village-level health
worker (also considered a village doctor) employed by
one of the pilot township health centres.
The lead author interviewed five facility managers, in-
cluding two from the two pilot township health centres
and two from a comparison township health centre (that
is considered a typical township health centre in the
city). Similar responses enhanced our confidence about
the generalizability of findings from the pilot-related
facilities. Three health administrators from the district
health bureau, the district NCMS agency, and the muni-
cipal NCMS agency (which initiated the pilot
programme) were also interviewed. Within each group
(except for patients), one interviewee was interviewed in
both 2014 and 2015 to check for policy and implementa-
tion consistency over time. The interviews were re-
corded, then transcribed by a professional company, and
checked by the lead author.
The third stage involved initial analysis of interview
transcripts. The lead author used the “Framework”
approach for data analysis developed by Ritchie and
Spencer [47], using the software NVivo 11 [48]. The
analysis was carried out in 3 steps. First, the lead author
familiarized himself with the range and diversity of the
data by listening to all the recordings and transcrip-
tions, and making notes. Second, a thematic frame-
work was developed based on both the preliminary
framework and field notes, and the thematic frame-
work was transferred into a structure of nodes in
NVivo 11. Third, the transcriptions were coded
according to these nodes, and further developed and
refined the nodes in repeated rounds.
The fourth stage involved interpretation of data and
tabulation. We interpreted the coded data and identified
factors related to the analysis, and associations between
them. These factors were classified into causes and ef-
fects (either direct or indirect). For each set of causes
and effects, key system variables were extracted and
causal links constructed. A set of causal links included
an upstream variable (cause) and at least one down-
stream variable (direct and indirect effects), as well as
arrows denoting the direction and polarity of each indi-
vidual causal link between the variables. The causes,
effects, and the sets of causal links were then tabulated,
along with the sources–the serial number of inter-
viewees that provided the supporting evidence.
For the fifth and final stage, we constructed a
causal loop diagram and analysed the diagram. The
constructed links were transferred into a draft causal
loop diagram. First, the causal links were connected
with overlapping variables to get feedback loops.
Second, we added delay marks for links that were as-
sociated with delays. Third, we gave each feedback
loop a specific name reflecting the general theme that
it described and added the signs representing the na-
ture (reinforcing or balancing) of the feedback loops.
Fourth, the serial numbers of causal loops that each
link fitted into was added to the table (see Appendix
Table 4) created in Stage 4, so that the process was
traceable. The finalized form of the intermediate re-
sults is presented in Appendix Table 4.
The actual workflow of these steps was iterative. The
interviewees responded to questions constructed from
the categorisation of the health system building blocks,
so there was no prior set of system variables to code
their response. Neither was the table created in Stage 4
constrained by a fully developed structure. The resulting
draft diagram had several places where the effects did
not link back to a cause directly or indirectly or where
the effects and causes were at different levels of detail.
We re-evaluated the constructed links and refined the
causes and effects in these links when necessary and rea-
sonable, by revisiting some of the source coding.
Neglected logical stages were added if needed, based on
logical reasoning. The diagram was drawn with Vensim®
Personal Learning Edition [49]. Symbolic representation
was used generally in accordance with Sterman [44] and
listed in Table 2.
Finally, we analysed the diagram for potential lessons
for policy making.
Table 2 Symbolic representation in the causal loop diagram
Symbol Meaning
X Y a positive causal link (all else being equal, a change in
the variable X leads to a change in the same direction
in variable Y, compared to when X is held constant)
X Y a negative causal link (all else being equal, a change in
the variable X leads to a change in the opposite
direction in variable Y, compared to when X is held
constant)
X Y a causal link with delay (change in Y take place after
change in X after a delay)
X Y a causal link introduced with the gatekeeping pilot
programme
X Y a causal link that was intended by policy makers but
not achieved
a balancing loop (sum of total numbers of negative
causal links is odd)
a reinforcing loop (sum of total numbers of negative
causal links is even)
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Study setting
The gatekeeping pilot was situated in the NCMS, a rural
insurance scheme (i.e. mainly for people with rural house-
hold registration) with a heavily tax-subsidized premium
and high co-payment rates which had been launched in
China in 2003 [50]. As in other areas, the NCMS fund in
the pilot district (a suburban district of a large city) was
pooled at district (comparable to county) level and man-
aged by an NCMS service centre under the District Health
Bureau. The district had a population of 0.42 million,
about half of which (over 99% of the eligible population)
were enrolled in the NCMS. Rural per capita income in
the district was 16,865 yuan, or 2,671 US dollars (USD) in
2012. During the three years between 2012 and 2014, each
enrolee paid a premium contribution of 100 yuan (15.8
USD) every year and participated through the unit of a
household, while government subsidy in the premium in-
creased from 540 to 900 yuan (85.5 to 142.6 USD) per
year. Local government paid the premium for people enti-
tled to a subsistence allowance.
Before the pilot, patients generally had unrestricted ac-
cess to health care facilities within the city; this included
municipal and district level hospitals and primary care
facilities (township health centres and village clinics,
most of which had been integrated with township
health centres). An important fact about the primary
care facilities in this specific study setting and China
in general is that most of the staff did not have
complete professional medical training. In 2013, only
11.9% of doctors at township health centres had a full
medical degree, compared to 66% in hospitals; the
overwhelming majority of doctors in township health
centres had three years of higher (43.3%) or middle
(40.7%) medical education (diploma) [51].
In July 2013, two townships in the suburban district
introduced a gatekeeping pilot programme where local
beneficiaries of the NCMS needed a referral letter from
primary care providers (i.e. township health centres and
their subordinate village health stations) to access care
at ambulatory departments of “secondary hospitals” and
claim reimbursement. The policy defined “secondary
hospitals” as all district-level hospitals and included the
local district hospital, which was actually a tertiary
hospital. To access the ambulatory department of the
higher-level hospitals and claim reimbursement, patients
needed a referral letter from the district hospital.
Patients could choose to opt out of the system through
paying out-of-pocket and not claiming for their expendi-
tures, as health facilities accepted self-paying patients. In
case of emergency, patients could go directly to emer-
gency departments in hospitals and would not need
referral for reimbursement.
The township health centres (including their subordin-
ate village health stations) in the pilot areas were given
an annual global budget for ambulatory services reim-
bursement and were responsible for all the expenditures
covered by the NCMS for ambulatory services at both
hospitals and primary care facilities. The annual budget
was calculated according to the level of ambulatory re-
imbursement per enrolee in 2012 (235 yuan, i.e. 37.2
USD, in one township and 133 yuan, i.e. 21 USD, in the
other)–the year prior to the start of the pilot, with a
minor 5% increment. In case of surplus at the end of the
financial year, the remaining funds would be kept by the
facilities as bonus for gatekeeping and so-called “family-
doctor-style services” (i.e. chronic illness management,
health records, etc.), though not for salary. Facilities
were responsible for any deficit.
Organization of the pilot implementation involved the
municipal and district health bureaux, township health
centres and village doctors in pilot areas. They mainly
disseminated the information through brochures and
health education lectures. Reform policies both within
and beyond the gatekeeping pilot underwent adjustment
in the year 2014. In order to “compensate” the benefi-
ciaries in the pilot townships for the restriction of
choice, the reimbursement rate for primary care facilities
in the pilot townships was slightly increased to 52% (up
from 50%) of their expenditures within the NCMS bene-
fit packages in 2014.
An overall scaling up of the pilot was planned but did
not happen. Nevertheless, for accessing the ambulatory
services in hospitals outside the district, referral policies
were implemented in the non-pilot townships of the dis-
trict in 2014. If patients sought ambulatory services in
hospitals outside the district without the referral letter
from the district hospital (which was itself a tertiary
hospital), they would receive only 80% of the reimburse-
ment they would have received before the change. From
interviews with the hospital doctors and manager, it was
clear that the NCMS agency also pushed the district
hospital to tighten the referral system, by warning
hospital managers of potential deduction from NCMS
reimbursement to hospitals if expenditures on referral
outside the district grew beyond their expectation. In
both 2014 and 2015, patients in pilot areas would not be
reimbursed if they went to an extra-district tertiary
hospital directly.
Results
This section explains the functioning of the gatekeeping
pilot using the CLD (Fig. 1), focusing on one feedback
loop at a time. We start from the intended policy effects
of the gatekeeping pilot programme (R1’ and B1’). Then
we analyse related factors and the feedback loops
they formed which challenged the feasibility of the
two intended feedback loops. This is followed by ex-
planation of three feedback loops (R1a, R1b and
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R1c) related to primary care facilities and three feed-
back loops involving hospitals (B2, R2, and R3).
Finally, we explain the policy resistance facing gate-
keeping itself (B1).
Intended dynamics
The gatekeeping pilot programme was intended to influ-
ence the incentives of both providers and patients. From
the demand side, the gatekeeping policy was expected to
make direct care seeking at hospitals less desirable, as
patients would not be able to claim their expenditures.
Ideally, this would lead to reduced patient visits to
hospitals, more patient visits to and more revenue of pri-
mary care facilities. From the supply side, the gatekeeping
pilot programme installed a fundholding role in the town-
ship health centres. Potential savings and expenditures
were supposed to be used as performance bonus for the
facility and by facility managers to improve services. This
was expected to reduce patients’ need to go to hospitals
(simplified as “hospital care attractiveness” in the dia-
gram). In short, the gatekeeping policy was intended to
establish and enhance a reinforcing feedback loop, whose
ultimate goal was to improve the balance between
hospitals and primary care facilities. Therefore, the loop
(R1’) was named “gatekeeping for balance of care”, shown
as blue arrows, also seen in Fig. 2.
Another intended feedback loop was on the referral in-
teractions between hospital visits and primary care visits.
While primary care visits were supposed to replace a sig-
nificant but unknown proportion of the hospital ambula-
tory visits, a portion of hospital patients were supposed to
be referred back to primary care facilities particularly for
follow up care. Therefore, there was an intended balancing
feedback loop (B1’, “referral balance”, also seen in Fig. 3)
between the visits to hospitals and referrals back to the
primary care facilities. If the feedback loop functioned as
intended, it would contribute to the balance of patient
visits between primary care facilities and hospitals.
Low incentive of performance-based salary
The intended R1’ feedback loop was obstructed due to
several factors mentioned by the interviewees. First,
hospital capacity
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Fig. 1 A causal loop diagram indicating the functioning of the gatekeeping pilot
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within the loop, the facility managers had limited ability
to use the performance bonus to incentivize service im-
provement. This was mainly due to a nation-wide
change in the salary policy [52, 53]. In order to maintain
financial sustainability of primary care facilities and curb
the profit-oriented over-prescription of drugs and ser-
vices, a previous revenue-based salary system based on
user fees had been replaced by a performance-based sal-
ary system based on a generally fixed total budget for
salaries. While the policy change enhanced the financial
sustainability of primary care facilities, it minimized
micro-economic incentives within the facility. The words
of a director of a township health centre illustrated the
ineffectiveness of using a performance bonus to stimu-
late doctors:
“The performance bonus comes from a [fixed] sum
of salary… [the staff] believe the performance bonus
is a portion of earning that one deserves… He
[or she] actually consider the money as part of his
regular entitlement. If you deduct his bonus, he
[or she] would be very unhappy… If one gets more,
others will get less… For those who receive extra
bonus, the amount cannot be too large. As a result,
the incentive is small… The intended aim of the
performance bonus could barely be achieved.”
(M02, interviewed in 2015)
The manager then recollected that before the reform
in 2009, when the bonus for staff had been tied to their
contribution to service revenue, the staff had been much
hospital care
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Fig. 2 R1’, an intended reinforcing feedback loop regarding the effects of gatekeeping for balance of care
hospital care
attractivenesshospital visits
PC visits
-
PC
+
-
referral
balance
-
B1'
PC ca
viciou
hospital revenue
hospital salary
+
hospital incentive
+
hospital-to-PC
referrals
+
+
hospital doctors lack
confidence in PC
capacity
-
technology +
+
-
+
hospital
performance
+
+ ser
low patient perception
of PC doctor capacity
+
+
PC losing
patients' faith
R1c
Fig. 3 B1’, an intended balancing feedback loop concerning mutual referrals
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more motivated. After the abolition of the revenue-
based bonus, he found it difficult to motivate his staff
and had been relying on ineffective persuasion. The dir-
ector of the other pilot township health centre used an
increasingly objective performance index system to
quantify the services and justify his decisions on salary
distribution. However, the performance-related payment
was kept lower than 300–400 yuan (47.5-63.4 USD) per
month, to minimise within-group tension that would
undermine the much-needed teamwork spirit (M01,
interviewed in 2014). Both managers (M01 and M02)
admitted that much of their management relied on
personal persuasion. In other words, the leveraging
power of the performance bonus appeared minimal. The
fundholding expectation ran counter to the salary policy
and became less effective than was desired.
Vicious cycles of primary care
The R1’ loop was further weakened by limitations of the
primary care facilities’ ability to provide curative func-
tions, which appeared to be in a vicious cycle (R1a, “PC
capacity vicious cycle”, see also Fig. 4). A doctor at a
pilot township health centre who had previously worked
at a retail pharmacy selling drugs said:
“I feel there is little difference with a pharmacy.
In a pharmacy, one also asks patients about their
conditions and then dispenses medicines. Here things
are basically the same… For some patient I would
suggest blood test, [but we cannot provide that]… I can
only give them some drugs that fit with the symptoms.
We have all the examination devices but nobody to
operate them.” (D04, interviewed in 2015).
Primary care facilities were in the process of
conversion to community health centres, therefore
eliminating some main functions related to the mini-
hospitals that they used to be. Inpatient care had
been virtually eliminated, as had surgical operations.
Reduced clinical experience and dysfunctioning equip-
ment of primary care facilities contributed to the de-
cline of primary care capacity. Two township health
centre managers complained that:
“The skills of all our doctors have been deserted.”
(M03, interviewed in 2015)
“We are not doing any [surgery]… Our director … used
to do all kinds of surgeries from head to foot.”
(M04, interviewed in 2015)
The regulations unwittingly reinforced a process of
breaking down the capacity (in curative care) and iden-
tity of what it meant to be a doctor at primary care level,
and constructed a vicious cycle of primary care capacity.
As primary care doctors were seen by both themselves
and patients as losing their key competence, the patients
who sensed serious illnesses just turned to hospitals
without visiting township health centres. The vicious cycle
was also reinforced by the unintended consequences of
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other policies beyond gatekeeping that did not attend to
the complexity involved in reforming primary care.
Furthermore, the imbalance between hospitals and
primary care facilities, in terms of use of medical tech-
nologies and pharmaceuticals, fed back towards patients’
preference for hospital care. Particularly, the nation-wide
essential pharmaceutical policy [54], while reducing pur-
chase prices for patients, restricted the pharmaceuticals
that primary care doctors could prescribe. The restriction
was made worse by the additional difficulty of transport in
the countryside. A patient complained passionately about
the restriction of access to pharmaceuticals:
“Now you have to go to large hospitals for serious
illness. We need to talk about the problem with
pharmaceuticals… Even if [the primary care
doctors] have the competence [of diagnosis and
prescription], [they] cannot prescribe certain
drugs… They are restricted by the level of facilities
… just as a capable housewife cannot cook a
meal without rice [note: it’s a Chinese saying
meaning nobody can make something out of
nothing].” (P03, interviewed in 2014)
Exacerbating the vicious cycle described above, the per-
formance evaluation system was driving the primary care
facilities further away from providing curative care. In the
offices of both chief directors of the pilot township health
centres, there hung a huge board of performance indicators
where curative care took only about 1/5 of the space, with
the rest devoted to performance management for the other
subjects—mainly essential public health services. The
pressure was intensified by the need to report to two agen-
cies—a community health management centre (an arms-
length agency under the district bureau of health) and a
disease control department under the bureau of health,
who had overlapping supervisory roles on the performance
of primary care facilities on the so-called “public health ser-
vices” including managing health records, follow up of
patients, etc. (M03 and M04, interviewed in 2015). A young
doctor in a pilot township health centre, who had trained
in clinical medicine, spent most of her time in the commu-
nity health department of the township health centre, and
was doing little clinical work because of the intense pres-
sure of performance evaluation, and her youth (and hence
lack of trust by patients, and low patient volume). She said:
“I certainly regretted, because I studied [clinical]
medicine and was prepared for that. But since it
was the requirement of work, I had no choice.”
(D02, interviewed in 2014)
This pivot was also reinforced by the reduced patient
visits and contributed to a downstream reduction of the
attractiveness of jobs as a primary care doctor. None of
the interviewed doctors who were spending their time in
disease management were happy about the situation.
There was an issue of sustainability of human resources
at primary care facilities (R1b, “PC HR sustainability”,
see also Fig. 5). Recruitment in the facilities mainly tar-
geted medical graduates with a three-year associate de-
gree (a full medical degree would require minimally five
years of training). Even that was difficult according to a
district health administrator (M03, interviewed in 2015).
Related to issues facing human resources was another
reinforcing loop that further challenged the intention of
the gatekeeping programme to reduce the number of pa-
tients bypassing primary care facilities. As the focus of
primary care doctors shifted towards public health
services, patients noticed that their service function was
reduced. Low patient perception of the capacity of
primary care doctors fed back towards hospital care at-
tractiveness (R1c, PC losing patients’ faith, see Fig. 6).
There appeared to be a breakdown of doctors’ profes-
sional status in the township health centres, not only
from the perspective of the disillusioned doctors, but
also of the nostalgic patients who said that in the past
the township health centres could deal with all kinds of
cases including some major surgery:
“they could cut out [diseased] lobes of lung, sections of
breast”. (P03 interviewed in 2014)
When considered together, R1a, R1b and R1c formed
a very strong tendency towards further declining func-
tions and capacity in primary care facilities, and erosion
of the professional status of doctors. The feedback loop
B1’ regarding post-hospitalization referral to primary
care was also illusionary, as the hospital doctors lacked
confidence in the capacity of primary care facilities. The
hospital manager interviewed said:
“now almost every young person goes to college
and gets a full degree, how would those who
could not get enrolled in a full degree university
programme be trusted to treat people’s illness?”
(M05, interviewed in 2015)
A doctor from the district hospital said:
“I don’t think they can solve any real [medical]
problem. Those with real problems would be referred
to tertiary hospitals… Regarding back referral [from
hospitals to township health centres], to be frank, we
operate according to the demand of patients… If the
patients believe it is inappropriate, we have to give
up… There are very few back referrals [in practice].”
(D07, interviewed in 2015)
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Challenges from hospitals
Besides the challenges within the primary care sector,
difficulties for gatekeeping also came from the interface
with hospitals. In order to improve the level of skills,
there was a training system in which newly recruited
medical graduates at primary care level underwent fur-
ther training at hospitals. According to a hospital doctor
and an officer of the district health bureau, many
seemed ready to give up their position in primary care if
they were offered a position in the hospitals. Therefore,
there was a balancing loop of human resources at the
primary care level (B2, “PC brain drain”, see also Fig. 7),
in which those with better training and career prospects
would leave primary care for hospitals. The lack of en-
forcement of a university medical education programme
to train rural students as doctors targeted for specific
rural primary care facilities (so-called “order-based train-
ing programme”–medical graduates admitted on such
special programmes were required to work at primary
care facilities in rural areas) was common, which facili-
tated the brain drain (A02, interviewed in 2015).
The self-reinforcing nature of the balance between pri-
mary care facilities and hospitals was particularly clear
when we examined the feedback loop R2 (“syphoning of
HR, patients and resources” also seen in Fig. 8). An inter-
view with the district hospital manager (M05, interviewed
in 2015) revealed that the brain drain of primary care was
mainly limited by the already depleted reservoir of capable
primary care doctors. In fact, the hospitals were actively
recruiting graduates with not only a university medical de-
gree but also masters graduates (three extra years of med-
ical training). The result perhaps was not just reduction in
recruitment at primary care level but also a deterioration
of quality and a further divergence of professional status
and aspiration. As the same manager in the district hos-
pital argued, some who preferred to stay at primary care
facilities were happy that way, because of a light workload
and a steady income—less stressful compared to hospitals.
Related to this was the increasing hospital visits associated
with the hospital incentive structure linked with revenue
generation. The hospitals (mainly the only district hospital)
attracted a lion’s share of revenue (A02, interviewed in 2015).
The hospitals also used such revenue to build up their ad-
vantage in equipment and infrastructure. In short, the com-
prehensive structural advantage of the hospital fed back to its
functional advantage in that it attracted ever more patients.
The advantage of hospitals also fed back to the policy
making process. The large patient volumes in hospitals pro-
vided them with strong bargaining power and reduced the
prospects of strict gatekeeping policies (R3, “hospital bar-
gaining power”, also seen in Fig. 9), particularly as local
government was required to provide care for most patients
within the range of district/county. In other words, the op-
position from the interests related to hospitals were chal-
lenging the sustainability of the gatekeeping pilot in its
current design. Indeed, the municipal NCMS administrator
was considering replacing the pilot programme by moving
the fundholding role (i.e. the capitation-based ambulatory
care budget) to the district hospital, as this tertiary hospital
and its doctors were believed to be more capable of acting
as gatekeepers (A03, interviewed in 2015).
Gatekeeping backfired
Finally, the gatekeeping policy backfired due to weak pri-
mary care capacity (B1, “resistance”, also seen in Fig. 10).
Patients found primary care facilities to be very restrict-
ive in services, technologies, and pharmaceuticals, and
felt they received little extra benefit when they came to
visit primary care facilities for referral. The extra visits
became a burden to primary care facilities, too.
“The patients came to us to be referred to the
district hospital, to the district hospital to be
referred to municipal hospitals. Will you say
that is not troublesome for them? It is
understandable that patients complained…
They are not willing to come here to get referral.
[They would say] I see doctors elsewhere but
[why do] I need you to give me a certificate.”
(D06, interviewed 2015)
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Most doctors and patients considered the policy an in-
convenience, though some also acknowledged that the
policy brought additional opportunities to make contact
with patients. The tension was also increased by the lack
of patient awareness, despite government’s effort to pub-
licize the policy change. In several cases, patients went
to hospitals first, and later found that they had to get a
referral from primary care doctors when they tried to
claim reimbursement. Pressured by patients (with whom
doctors had a potentially tense relationship) and limited
by the capacity to provide clinical services that could re-
place patients’ care seeking at hospitals, primary care
doctors usually just wrote referral letters for patients
(P01, interviewed in 2014).
Furthermore, there was little integrative care arrange-
ments (e.g. priority access compared to self-referred
patients) to facilitate the care seeking of patients in ter-
tiary hospitals, even if they got a referral from primary
hospital capacity
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care facilities (D02, interviewed in 2015). The referral re-
quirement thus became largely ritualistic, which added
to the resentment of doctors and patients. In particular,
gatekeeping hurt local elites who had more say in the
political process (e.g. people’s representatives), and these
people pressured local leaders to abolish strict gatekeep-
ing policies (A02, interviewed in 2015).
Discussion
Limitations and value of the approach
One limitation is that the study did not allow inter-
viewees or independent experts to validate the causal
loop model, which has been recommended [55]. After a
failed attempt to explain an earlier draft of the CLD to
some municipal policy makers, the lead author found it
difficult to use the CLD as a communication tool to pol-
icy makers who had little prior training, and to explore
this further was beyond the capacity of the study. The
findings should therefore be seen as the understanding
of the researcher, generated through a rigorous process.
The approach used in this study seems to have advan-
tages in understanding the complexity involved in shifting
balance of care through interventions like gatekeeping. The
use of the WHO categorisation of health systems building
blocks facilitated a systematic mapping of factors related to
gatekeeping. In the study, applying the categorisation facili-
tated the identification of issues directly related to the
mechanisms of gatekeeping such as financing (e.g. the inef-
fective performance-based bonus), but also less directly re-
lated to gatekeeping such as pharmaceutical policies and
technologies (e.g. restriction of access to medicine).
The application of a CLD has allowed the study to bring
together the separate analyses to understand the interrela-
tionships between different factors within and across cat-
egories of building blocks. One particular advantage is
related to dealing with unintended consequences of
policies indirectly related to gatekeeping (e.g. the restric-
tion and change regarding the service functions of primary
care practitioners contributed to a deterioration of service
capacity of primary care facilities). The CLD also has
allowed the study to identify both local patterns of feed-
back loops and how these feedback loops formed a holistic
picture of all the key factors related to gatekeeping.
Overall, the approach bridged analysis of the gatekeep-
ing pilot with analysis of the system within which the
gatekeeping pilot was embedded. The approach brought
into the qualitative evaluation of gatekeeping the three
dimensions of interrelationships, perspectives and
boundaries, highlighted in the systems literature [43]. It
revealed the richness of interrelationships among differ-
ent factors within the health system that were directly or
indirectly related to gatekeeping functioning, reflected
the multiple perspectives of different groups of stake-
holders, and encouraged a deeper understanding of the
boundaries by highlighting the linkages between the
intervention and the system, as well as by examining
unintended consequences of the gatekeeping pilot.
Furthermore, the approach of qualitative systems analysis
developed in this study was explicit and transparent. A sys-
tematic review of the recent use of system science and sys-
tems thinking for public health suggested that studies using
systems modelling methods should make the formulation of
models (in this case a CLD) explicit enough for readers to
judge the rigour of the studies or to repeat the process [55].
The complicated process and lack of transparency of interim
stages made causal loop analysis prone to issues regarding
accountability. The danger of misunderstanding the system
based on a model with suboptimal rigour is also amplified by
the assumed interconnectedness of the factors. However,
guidance on how to rigorously develop CLDs based on
qualitative methods and data have been lacking. This study
has established an example of a transparent and rigorous
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approach to qualitative systems analysis of a complex health
systems intervention.
Findings regarding gatekeeping and implications beyond
The study has presented the first evidence on the
intended and actual functioning of gatekeeping in a pilot
in rural China. Within the study context, the intended
mechanisms of gatekeeping in changing patients’
utilization pattern of care were not achieved. The
intended supply-side incentive on treating a greater
number of patients at local facilities did not seem to
have functioned as expected, as the salary policy was too
rigid with a level of pay too low to either attract or in-
centivise gatekeeping-related clinical work. On the de-
mand side, a large number of patients appeared to be
going through primary care reluctantly to get referral in
a generally ritualistic process. The implementation of
the approach of gatekeeping in the studied pilot led to
dissatisfaction of both doctors and patients. This contra-
dicts a patient survey done in Shenzhen [56] that
showed stated willingness of local residents to accept
community health centres as gatekeepers.
Besides public resentment, potential adverse effects in-
cluded delay of diagnosis or misdiagnosis. The study did not
investigate this issue directly, but the weak primary care cap-
acity suggested that this would be hard to avoid [34], if a sig-
nificant number of patients relied on the primary care
providers. Furthermore, given the different capacity of pri-
mary care facilities and hospitals, implementing gatekeeping
only for the NCMS could potentially exacerbate inequity by
restricting their access to facilities of lower service quality.
The study identified three aspects that led to the sub-
optimal functioning of the gatekeeping pilot. First, the
weak conditions of primary care, particularly regarding
the clinical skills of primary care doctors in comparison
with those in hospitals, seemed to be a fundamental bar-
rier facing the reform. The nation-wide gap between
qualifications of primary care doctors and hospital doc-
tors was sustained over the recent decade when social
health insurance coverage was extended to the whole
population [57]. Therefore, it was understandable that
patients in the pilot townships were not satisfied when
their eligibility for direct access to ambulatory services
in hospitals were taken from them.
Second, the study has further revealed reinforcing
feedbacks that turned into a series of vicious cycles for
primary care development, in terms of the weakened
service capacity of primary care, the decreasing patients’
trust of primary care and questionable sustainability of
human resources for primary care. The study has shown
the danger of neglecting the professional aspiration of
primary care practitioners and patients’ appreciation of
their competence, which seems still to hinge on the abil-
ity of primary care practitioners to provide curative care.
The lack of progress in reforming hospitals exacer-
bated the imbalance between the two sectors. Despite
reform in primary care, the inflationary incentive struc-
ture in hospital care remained unchanged. Hospitals
were systematically absorbing human resources, patients,
and other resources, contributing to greater imbalance
in the system. Hospitals (particularly the district hospital
in the pilot area) have become increasingly the main
provider of curative care and received most of the total
medical expenditures. This is corroborated by a quanti-
tative analysis comparing nation-wide service utilization
in hospitals and primary care providers in recent years
[57]. The self-reinforcing nature of the imbalance be-
tween hospitals and primary care facilities could mean
increasing difficulty in future reforms.
Third, the effectiveness of gatekeeping was hampered by
the unintended consequences related to conflicts among dif-
ferent priorities required of primary care development. Pri-
mary care facilities have been loaded with much aspiration
for the ultimate goal of universal health coverage in low- and
middle-income countries. There coexisted multiple policy
initiatives in the pilot as well as China-wide: strengthening
the function of primary care facilities in curative primary
care, strengthening the function of primary care facilities in
preventive primary care for the increasingly prevalent non-
communicable diseases, curbing over-prescription related to
the previous incentive structure, and reducing pharmaceut-
ical prices. These intersecting reforms provided plenty of
scope for clashes and inconsistences. The findings suggested
challenges in changing the functions of primary care
facilities, as primary care facilities have relied for years on
mechanisms similar to those in the hospital sector (revenue-
generation, recognition of professional status focused on
treating diseases, etc.).
Technological regulations, some of which aimed at
standardizing primary care facilities and improving the
alignment of their service with a primary care orientation,
appeared to undermine the basis of trust in primary care
providers’ technical capacity. The effort to strengthen
chronic disease prevention (e.g. focus on performance in-
dicators of “public health services” including follow up
care of chronic patients) was important as a corrective ac-
tion to the previous focus on curative care. However, it
might undermine efforts to provide more and better cura-
tive care at primary care facilities, and even break down
the appreciation of professional status and competence of
primary care practitioners by both patients and colleagues.
In relation to this, the performance-based salary policy
reform and a virtually fixed budget payment system, by
eliminating the previous incentive to over-prescribe,
seemed to have affected the facility manager’s entrepre-
neurship and ability to motivate staff. The essential drug
policies, which seemed to have unintendedly led to lim-
ited access to pharmaceuticals at primary care facilities,
Xu and Mills International Journal for Equity in Health  (2017) 16:106 Page 14 of 21
also restricted the range of services available at this level.
Previous studies have suggested these were common chal-
lenges facing primary care facilities in China [6], though
our study further elucidated the underlying dynamics.
Generalizability of the study’s findings based on infor-
mation from the pilot district of a metropolitan city in
northern China cannot be achieved through statistical in-
ference from the case data to larger geographical units.
However, most of the policies involved (with the exception
of gatekeeping) were made nationally and implemented
nation-wide. The issue of structural and functional imbal-
ance between hospitals and primary care facilities has
been a nation-wide phenomenon as reflected in the refer-
ences cited above from nation-wide studies. On the basis
of what Yin defined as analytical generalization, which
builds generalization upon theoretical comparability [58],
this first qualitative evaluation about a pioneer gatekeep-
ing pilot is relevant to comparable settings in rural China,
which faces essentially similar challenges.
Overall, the study has suggested that the gatekeeping
pilot failed to alter the dynamics involved in an increas-
ingly imbalanced local health system. If scaled up and
strictly adopted in settings with weak primary care, gate-
keeping of the kind implemented in the pilot could lead
to other undesirable outcomes. These might include
public resentment and other unintended consequences
in equity and quality of care (e.g. delayed diagnosis),
which could undermine the momentum for shifting the
balance from hospitals to primary care providers. Gate-
keeping pilots need to be attempted in areas with better
primary care conditions, and combined with supporting
policies, including collaboration with hospitals, perhaps
selectively for specific health problems.
More broadly, the difficulties facing primary care
strengthening in rural settings also indicated the risks re-
lated to a lack of appreciation of the complexity involved
in primary care functioning in reality and the potential
and manifested conflicts among multiple reform priorities,
as well as lack of progress in hospital reform. Measures to
strengthen primary care should be careful not to change
too fast the function of doctors without managing profes-
sional aspirations, while they should also be bold enough
to promote consistent and harmonised changes.
The converging point of primary-care-related policies in
rapid and multidimensional transition on multiple fronts
should be centred on the people at the core of primary
care delivery. What is needed seems to be a systemic effort
to reconstruct primary care professionals. Such efforts
should not be stand-alone policies such as training general
practitioners, but a human-centric reform expanded to
cover the clarification of organizational functions of pri-
mary care facilities with development of primary care
teams, adequate financing of primary care, professional
development, and other supporting elements (including
access to technologies and medicines). In addition, reform of
hospitals to constrain their profit-orientated expansion
should also be pushed forward. For other similar settings, les-
sons may be learnt from China’s problematic combination of
delayed hospital reform with rapid primary care reform.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a qualitative systems
analysis of how gatekeeping functioned under con-
straints in a pilot in rural China. The study has revealed
the ineffectiveness of gatekeeping in shifting the balance
towards primary care. The current salary policy was too
rigid with a level of pay too low to either attract or in-
centivise gatekeeping-related clinical work.
The study has suggested a number of underlying sys-
tems factors that restricted the functioning of gatekeep-
ing in the pilot area. The weakness of primary care
capacity (particularly in terms of human resources) lay
at the heart of ineffective gatekeeping. Primary care facil-
ities were also trapped in vicious cycles. Particularly dan-
gerous was the phenomenon that the primary care
doctors were losing patient trust and professional aspira-
tions. Unintended consequences of a number of concur-
rent policies also impeded strengthening of primary care
functioning. Strict regulation on pharmaceuticals and
the technological imbalance between primary care and
hospitals limited the medicines and technologies avail-
able to primary care facilities. The delayed reform of
perverse hospital incentives also contributed to the bar-
riers to successful functioning of gatekeeping.
The findings imply that two kinds of logic are needed in
formulating policies to improve the underlying conditions
of gatekeeping. On the one hand, the vicious cycles that
primary care facilities were facing requires bold and timely
measures. In particular, it seems necessary and urgent to
elevate the competence of primary care doctors, who
should also be provided with career prospects. Hospital
reform should also be pushed forward to tame their profit
orientation. On the other hand, the findings suggest
caution on reforms regarding primary care. Rather than
shuffling of functions, the policy makers should design re-
form in which primary care doctors can consolidate their
professional standing and the trust of patients and col-
leagues. There should also be mechanisms to learn from
experience and make timely policy adjustments.
The study has demonstrated the use of a qualitative
systems approach to study a complex health system
intervention, and identified the limitations and value of
the approach. Further research may build on the trans-
parency demonstrated in this study and the approach to
model construction should be recorded and reported
clearly. Future studies with more resources might offer a
training course to policy makers on the value and use of
CLDs.
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Appendix
Table 3 List of interviewees and their characteristics
Interviewees Serial numbers Type of facilities /institutions Gender Age group Year of interview
Patients P01 Primary care Male 51–60 2014
P02 Primary care Female 51–60 2014
P03 Primary care Male 61–70 2014
P04 Primary care Male 51–60 2015
P05 Primary care Female 51–60 2015
P06 Primary care Female 61–70 2015
Doctors D01 Primary care Female 41–50 2014
D02 Primary care Female 21–30 2014, 2015
D03 Primary care Female 41–50 2014
D04 Primary care Female 41–50 2014
D05 Primary care Female 41–50 2015
D06 Primary care Female 41–50 2015
D07 Hospital Male 41–50 2015
D08 Hospital Female 41–50 2015
Facility managers M01 Primary care Male 41–50 2014, 2015
M02 Primary care Male 51–60 2015
M03 Primary care Male 51–60 2015
M04 Primary care Male 51–60 2015
M05 Hospital Female 41–50 2015
Health administrators A01 District health bureau Male 51–60 2014
A02 District NCMS agency Male 41–50 2014, 2015
A03 Municipal NCMS agency Male 41–50 2015
Note: NCMS stands for New Rural Cooperative Medical Schemes
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